Scientific Truth and The Arbitrament of Praxis

The aim of science as a cognitive venture is to provide us with information about how matters stand in world-with an estimate as to of things. But this perspective at once poses question: can we say anything about how good an estimate of the real truth science in fact provides? Clearly we cannot determine of things directly, independently of scientific inquiry, and then endeavor to monitor adequacy of our science by comparing its deliverances with this independently determined truth.' Therejust is no science-independent means at our disposal for getting at real of things. On other hand, we can, however, monitor adequacy of our science by considering how well we fare when it comes to applying and implementing its claims in prediction and control. On this perspective, adequacy of our predictive and interventionist praxis becomes quality-controlling monitor of our scientific claims, doing so not because of an instrumentalistic commitment which, abandoning pursuit of truth, sees prediction and control as sole goals of science, butfaute de mieux, because there is no prospect of any more direct alternative, any immediate comparison of these claims with science-independent real-truth of things. Received wisdom has it that telos of science is represented by traditional quartet of description, explanation, prediction, and control. This produces following picture: