"It's Money That Matters": Campaign Expenditures and State Legislative Primaries
David A. Breaux, Anthony Gierzynski
Abstract
David A. Breaux, Anthony Gierzynski
Abstract
This paper develops and tests an empirical model of state legislative primary outcomes that focuses on campaign expenditures. The analysis of primary elections indicates that candidates in six of the seven states analyzed are able to increase their share of the primary vote by increasing their level of campaign spending. By increasing their own level of campaign spending, candidates are also able to affect negatively the opponent's share of the primary vote. As in state legislative general elections, incumbency status in state legislative primaries affords candidates a clear advantage. If the general elections to state legislatures are still largely a mystery to political scientists, the primary elections are a virtual black hole. Direct primaries were instituted to make elections more democratic, and they have existed for most of this century. Yet we know little about how they operate at the state legislative level. How competitive are state legislative primaries? How democratic are they? What factors shape the outcome of primary elections? How important is incumbency? What role does money play in primary elections? This paper looks at these questions by developing and testing a model of state legislative primary elections that focuses on campaign expenditures. The role of money in state legislative primary elections has important implications for how those elections are viewed. The direct primary was created to take control of nominations away from the party elite. Because of the power of incumbency, however, direct primaries may merely have shifted control between elites-from party organization elites to party-in-government elites (Sorauf and Beck 1988). If money is also an important factor in shaping the outcome of legislative primaries, then we must question the extent to which primaries have made state legislative elections more democratic.
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This paper develops and tests an empirical model of state legislative primary outcomes that focuses on campaign expenditures. The analysis of primary elections indicates that candidates in six of the seven states analyzed are able to increase their share of the primary vote by increasing their level of campaign spending. By increasing their own level of campaign spending, candidates are also able to affect negatively the opponent's share of the primary vote. As in state legislative general elections, incumbency status in state legislative primaries affords candidates a clear advantage. If the general elections to state legislatures are still largely a mystery to political scientists, the primary elections are a virtual black hole. Direct primaries were instituted to make elections more democratic, and they have existed for most of this century. Yet we know little about how they operate at the state legislative level. How competitive are state legislative primaries? How democratic are they? What factors shape the outcome of primary elections? How important is incumbency? What role does money play in primary elections? This paper looks at these questions by developing and testing a model of state legislative primary elections that focuses on campaign expenditures. The role of money in state legislative primary elections has important implications for how those elections are viewed. The direct primary was created to take control of nominations away from the party elite. Because of the power of incumbency, however, direct primaries may merely have shifted control between elites-from party organization elites to party-in-government elites (Sorauf and Beck 1988). If money is also an important factor in shaping the outcome of legislative primaries, then we must question the extent to which primaries have made state legislative elections more democratic.
Key concepts: Legislature, State (computer science), Political science, Public administration, Political economy, Economics, Law, Computer science