Confirmation Holism and Underdetermination in Quine's Thought Holismo confirmacional e subdeterminação no pensamento de Quine

Quine is frequently acknowledged as one of the main proponents of both confi rmation holism and underdetermination. In the recent literature, however, his views have been often criticized and misrepresented: the distinction between the two theses has been often blurred, the obviousness of holism has been rejected, and the plausibility of underdetermination has come under attack. This paper attempts to formulate both theses as clearly as possible and to defend Quine’s views against some recurrent criticisms. In particular, it is argued that Quine’s theses are signifi cantly weaker than they have been taken to be and that only confi rmation holism, but not underdetermination, plays a fundamental role in his philosophy.