NEW REGIONAL REALITY

NEW REGIONAL REALITY. (By Nadezhda Arbatova. Nezavisimaya gazeta, Sept. 16, 2015, p. 5. Complete text:) The Ukraine conflict, which epitomizes all the contradictions and mutual disappointments between Russia and the West, has divided and for the first time since the end of the cold war, the two sides are once again on the verge of a total breakup. Yet it is not just between Russia and the West that dividing lines are emerging; the whole European continent is affected, including the CIS. There are also divisions within individual countries. Metaphorically speaking, looks like a broken mirror today. ... Schism in NATO and the European Union. ... It was former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who coined the terms Old Europe and Rumsfeld used the term Old Europe to describe primarily Germany and France, which refused to support the [2003] US invasion in Iraq and thus, in Rumsfeld's view, were not truly Atlantic. By Europe, Rumsfeld meant former members of the Eastern Bloc, who were more dedicated to the Atlantic cause. New European countries with fresh memories of their own dictatorships were more responsive to human rights issues than their neighbors in Western Europe, Rumsfeld said. Actually, if we look at the way different EU nations are handling the current migrant crisis, Rumsfeld's statement sounds questionable, to say the least. But this is not the point. The point is that the countries in Central and Eastern did not want to be a buffer zone between Russia and the West, and were eager to join NATO in order to ensure their security. But now, if the Ukraine conflict escalates, it is these countries that would be closest to the war zone and would have to deal with everything that entails. ... The rift between Russia and the West over Ukraine has highlighted the lack of harmony among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The Visegrad Four are divided. Three members of the Visegrad Group - the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary - have distanced themselves from Poland, assuming a more cautious stance on Ukraine and expressing skepticism about anti-Russian sanctions. Their primary motive in doing so is Euroskepticism, rather than Russophilia. They are less optimistic about political processes in Ukraine than Washington or Brussels, because they see them as a risk to their own security, first and foremost, and to stability in in general. ... Poland, on the other hand, wholeheartedly supports Kiev and advocates a tough line against Russia, siding with the so-called faction - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The principle of this schism is very simple: The countries that border Russia have adopted the most uncompromising position on Moscow's Ukraine policy. Due to historical reasons, they are particularly sensitive to situations like Russia's annexation of the Crimea [see Current Digest, Vol. 66, No. 12, pp. 3-11] or, in fact, the very concept of the world. In other words, the redistribution of forces in Central and Eastern is certainly a new reality. ... Yet in the best-case scenario, if the Ukraine conflict gets resolved, the same countries could be part of a greater cooperation space, which would include the East European segment of the post-Soviet space. It would be possible to restore the institution of confidence-building measures in such a space, especially mechanisms to prevent a potential military conflict due to the misinterpretation of, or lack of information regarding, the other side's military activities, and turn it into a partially demilitarized zone. There have been a few incidents in and over the Baltic and Black Seas recently, indicating an increased risk of collisions between Russian and Western warships and planes, so it would be helpful to go back to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement between the Soviet Union and the US, and sign a similar treaty between Russia and the NATO countries. ... Ironically enough, it is these former members of the Eastern bloc - which made Moscow so nervous about increasingly anti-Russian sentiment in when they joined the EU and NATO - that theoretically might initiate a new Eastern policy within these alliances. ... Cracks in the Eastern Partnership. ... As for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, which prompted the clash between Russia and the EU over Ukraine in the first place, both Brussels and the Partnership members continue to demonstrate their commitment to the policy in public, but at the same time they are skeptical about the project, as evidenced by the EaP summit, which took place in Riga on May 22 and was largely symbolic [see Current Digest, Vol. 67, No. 21, pp. 6-9]. Brussels wanted to show EaP members that it was still interested in the project and committed to the idea of developing closer ties with the Eastern Partners. Yet the Riga summit exposed the flaws that have plagued the Eastern Partnership from the start - namely, the lack of an ultimate goal for the countries that have embarked on the path of painful reforms - and also revealed that the architects of the Eastern Partnership are in fact at a loss themselves, because they are not ready to make any far-reaching decisions at this point, given the ongoing crisis with Russia.