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2007•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

CARTEL FINES IN EUROPE

Cento G. Veljanovski

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Abstract

This article examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price- fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines were calculated in practice under the 1998 penalty guidelines, leniency notices and appeals, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the 2006 penalty guidelines by recalculating fines for the decided cartel cases.

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What this paper is about

This article examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price- fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines were calculated in practice under the 1998 penalty guidelines, leniency notices and appeals, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the 2006 penalty guidelines by recalculating fines for the decided cartel cases.

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Available abstract

This article examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price- fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines were calculated in practice under the 1998 penalty guidelines, leniency notices and appeals, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the 2006 penalty guidelines by recalculating fines for the decided cartel cases.

Key concepts: Cartel, Price fixing, Competition law, European commission, Competition (biology), Commission, Law and economics, Economics

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