The People's Republic of China and her relations with the countries of the association of Southeast Asian nations : 1969-1975

Phe Ihesis examines the evolution of the -policies of \nthe People fs Jtenublie of China towards J?hail°nd, PTal ysia, \nSingapore, Iidonesia pad the Philip-pines, organised in \nthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations from 1969 to 1975• \n2ze first central point of this study is an *ir sumption \nthat the foreign relations of The People's Tepublic of \nChi la Towards Southeast ^sia have been motivated by a \ndynamic interplay of t^o main factors: (1) Farxist-Leninist \nideology and ICao J^e-tung Ph^ught, which dictate to China \nto behave as a revolutionary Dover vhich must assist the \ninsurgent movements in the area in their strug fle to overthrow \nthe local governments; (2) national interest, vhich \ndemands of China to safeguard the southern flank of her \nterritory bordering on Southerst 'sia through Friendly relations, \ntrade and ot*»er conventional inrtniments of diplomacy. \nhile the tvo main motive factors are nuTually antagonistic \nand exclusivet the Chinere leaders are nevertheless \nat te mi ting to oring them iirco a coherent policy under Mao's \ntheory of tve {hniity of op-nosites," vhich believes that it \nis -possible to reconcile these co-posing tendencies into a \ndynamic enuibrium through vhich both opnosites could be \npromoted at the same time although not to the same extent* \nla other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic \nequilibrium as a continuum between them in a mix in which \none or the other orientation predominates in different \n•periods* Bins we might see China1 s conduct motivated in one \nperiod by mostly ideological considerations at the expense \nof the staire-to-state relations, then ve might see her policy \nin the middle of the continuum and suf ering from immo bill sine \nand just muddling through, or finally ?fe might see her emphasising \nfriendly ties at the expense of support of revolutionary \nmovements at the other extreme -point of the spectrum* \n!fhe mechanism vhich enables Peking to move from one \npole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the \nfollowing elementsJ (1) the result of an internal power \nstruggle within the leadership in Peking between ideologically \nradical and moderate elements, which enables the victorious \nfaction to initiate nev policies; (2) Peking's assessment \nof the changing intentions and capabilities of the major \npowers in the area; (3) internal changes within the countries \nof the area and the changing attitudes of their \ngovernments towards China; (4) changing fortunes of revolutionary \nmovements operating in the area* \n'Phe second major point of this study is an assertion \nthat while China's conduct toward Southeast *lsia after her \nfoundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological \nconsiderations, the beginning of the seventies saw the \nnational interest reasserting itself as the leading motive \nfactor* Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast \nasia in terms of relevance of fllong historical ties," \ncasting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother11 \nwho is entitled to reopect and deference in exchange for \npatronage and protection* Hence the traditional echoes \nof the past are emerging ever stronger and influencing \nher postures towards the region, while the open support \nto revolutionary moevments is underplayed at the moment.