Information market games

In this paper information markets with perfect patent protection and only one initial owner of the information are studied by means of cooperative game theory. To each information market of this type a cooperative game with sidepayments is constructed. These cooperative games are called information (market) games. The set of all information games with fixed player set is a cone in the set of all cooperative games with the same player set. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given in order that a cooperative game is an information game. The core of this kind of games is not empty and is also the minimal subsolution of the game. The core is the image of an (n-1)-dimensional hypercube under an affine transformation, (= hyperparallellopiped), the nucleolus and τ-value coincide with the center of the core. The Shapley value is computed and may lie inside or outside the core. The Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus and the τ-value if and only if the information game is convex. In this case the core is also a stable set.