The Direction of Time: A Focused Critique of an Argument for the Presentist Metaphysic

In a series of recent works, William Lane Craig attempts to provide a comprehensive survey of a contemporary debate within the philosophy of time — whether time is dynamic and tensed (the A theoretical view) or static and tenseless (the B theoretical view). Craig’s position, referred to as the “presentist metaphysic,” is composed of two foundational claims: (a) tense and (b) temporal becoming are real and objective, as opposed to mind dependent or subjective. Craig defends this particular metaphysic of A theory, arguing that it is more epistemically warranted than other competing theories of time since it explains the asymmetry of time. The objectivity of tense explains temporal anisotropy, while the objectivity of temporal becoming explains the direction of time. The second claim, (b) or the objectivity of temporal becoming, is the main focus of my paper. Craig argues specifically that (b) explains the direction of time, represented thus: