Ancient Threats to Modern Liberties: Tocqueville and the Contemporary Debate between Republicans and Liberals
Paweł Marczewski
Abstract
Paweł Marczewski
Abstract
The present contribution is an attempt at showing that Tocqueville's conception of liberty transcended the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. The author starts by juxtaposing it with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of indi- vidual rights, as Claude Lefort has rightly pointed out, Tocqueville was much more reluctant accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. He did not accept the view that jouissances privees, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The article then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville's standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Opponents in this discussion seem be so devoted demonstrating that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against any threats liberty, both factual and potential, that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that to be free is be guided by one's own will contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant and towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution crucial discussions in contemporary political philosophy.
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The present contribution is an attempt at showing that Tocqueville's conception of liberty transcended the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. The author starts by juxtaposing it with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of indi- vidual rights, as Claude Lefort has rightly pointed out, Tocqueville was much more reluctant accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. He did not accept the view that jouissances privees, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The article then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville's standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Opponents in this discussion seem be so devoted demonstrating that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against any threats liberty, both factual and potential, that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that to be free is be guided by one's own will contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant and towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution crucial discussions in contemporary political philosophy.
Key concepts: Negative liberty, Politics, Opposition (politics), Law, Political science, Treasure, Freedom of thought, Philosophy