Theories of Knowledge : Is a naturalised epistemology bound to leave unanswered some important epistemological questions?
Lukas Graf
Abstract
Lukas Graf
Abstract
For Quine epistemology as it is traditionally approached in philosophy is mistaken because it is based on the untenable concept of foundationalism. However, Quine’s contribution to epistemology is not merely a destructive one; he comes up with a new theory. Anyone assessing this theory, naturalised epistemology, ultimately wants to know whether it provides an answer to the central questions of epistemology. In this paper it is discussed whether naturalised epistemology is bound to leave some of these questions unanswered.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
For Quine epistemology as it is traditionally approached in philosophy is mistaken because it is based on the untenable concept of foundationalism. However, Quine’s contribution to epistemology is not merely a destructive one; he comes up with a new theory. Anyone assessing this theory, naturalised epistemology, ultimately wants to know whether it provides an answer to the central questions of epistemology. In this paper it is discussed whether naturalised epistemology is bound to leave some of these questions unanswered.
Key concepts: Foundationalism, Quine, Epistemology, Epistemology of Wikipedia, Formal epistemology, Meta-epistemology, Social epistemology, Philosophy