2016•PhilosophiaOpen access

What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond

Konrad Werner

Abstract

I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that "what is it like" means primarily "what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject".

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Key concepts: Metaphysics, Philosophy of language, Subject (documents), Epistemology, Philosophy of science, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy, Position (finance)