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Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement

John F. Coyle

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Abstract

All nations purposely structure their foreign economic policy in ways that channel the gains of trade away from adversaries and toward allies. In this sense, foreign economic policy is now and has long been a strategic instrument used by great powers in their dealings with one another. The debate within the United States over whether to grant permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China, the imposition of economic sanctions upon "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq, and the European Union's decision to bring the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the single market all constitute uses of foreign economic policy to realize goals other than solely those of maximizing the economic welfare of nations or interest groups. Rather, foreign economic policy is a tool by which governments can (and often do) pursue non-economic ends.

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All nations purposely structure their foreign economic policy in ways that channel the gains of trade away from adversaries and toward allies. In this sense, foreign economic policy is now and has long been a strategic instrument used by great powers in their dealings with one another. The debate within the United States over whether to grant permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China, the imposition of economic sanctions upon "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq, and the European Union's decision to bring the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the single market all constitute uses of foreign economic policy to realize goals other than solely those of maximizing the economic welfare of nations or interest groups. Rather, foreign economic policy is a tool by which governments can (and often do) pursue non-economic ends.

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Available abstract

All nations purposely structure their foreign economic policy in ways that channel the gains of trade away from adversaries and toward allies. In this sense, foreign economic policy is now and has long been a strategic instrument used by great powers in their dealings with one another. The debate within the United States over whether to grant permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China, the imposition of economic sanctions upon "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq, and the European Union's decision to bring the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the single market all constitute uses of foreign economic policy to realize goals other than solely those of maximizing the economic welfare of nations or interest groups. Rather, foreign economic policy is a tool by which governments can (and often do) pursue non-economic ends.

Key concepts: Rules of origin, Tariff, International trade, Competition (biology), Product (mathematics), Politics, Economics, International economics

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Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement — Research Paper | ScholarLens