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Costs of Sovereignty

K.A.D. Camara

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Abstract

I categorize normative theories of private international law as naturalist, nationalist, or internationalist. Naturalist theories, including Beale's territorialism and Currie's interest analysis, limit state law according to an evident or higher-law notion of sovereignty. Nationalist theories limit state law only by state interest, taking into account the reactions of other states. Internationalist theories, including Brilmayer's state-subject connection, limit state law to account for the moral-philosophical claims of other states and their citizens to regulatory authority. I then defend strong-form nationalism, distinguishing it from Goldsmith's and Posner's weak-form nationalism. I explain the costs other states can impose to deter excessive law application - costs of sovereignty - and how state legal decision-makers should take these into account. And I offer several examples drawn from national practice to illustrate this analysis. Finally I discuss connections and extensions to: (1) positive claims about private-international-law practice and the relationship between private-international and corporate law; (2) sticky sovereignty and private-international-law technology, which enables states to better tailor their regulatory claims; (3) camouflaging sovereignty as an alternative to cutting back; (4) delegating sovereignty and the allocation of regulation between the state and private organizations; and (5) nationalism from the perspective of a federal organization regulating conflicts between subsidiary states.

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I categorize normative theories of private international law as naturalist, nationalist, or internationalist. Naturalist theories, including Beale's territorialism and Currie's interest analysis, limit state law according to an evident or higher-law notion of sovereignty. Nationalist theories limit state law only by state interest, taking into account the reactions of other states. Internationalist theories, including Brilmayer's state-subject connection, limit state law to account for the moral-philosophical claims of other states and their citizens to regulatory authority. I then defend strong-form nationalism, distinguishing it from Goldsmith's and Posner's weak-form nationalism. I explain the costs other states can impose to deter excessive law application - costs of sovereignty - and how state legal decision-makers should take these into account. And I offer several examples drawn from national practice to illustrate this analysis. Finally I discuss connections and extensions to: (1) positive claims about private-international-law practice and the relationship between private-international and corporate law; (2) sticky sovereignty and private-international-law technology, which enables states to better tailor their regulatory claims; (3) camouflaging sovereignty as an alternative to cutting back; (4) delegating sovereignty and the allocation of regulation between the state and private organizations; and (5) nationalism from the perspective of a federal organization regulating conflicts between subsidiary states.

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Available abstract

I categorize normative theories of private international law as naturalist, nationalist, or internationalist. Naturalist theories, including Beale's territorialism and Currie's interest analysis, limit state law according to an evident or higher-law notion of sovereignty. Nationalist theories limit state law only by state interest, taking into account the reactions of other states. Internationalist theories, including Brilmayer's state-subject connection, limit state law to account for the moral-philosophical claims of other states and their citizens to regulatory authority. I then defend strong-form nationalism, distinguishing it from Goldsmith's and Posner's weak-form nationalism. I explain the costs other states can impose to deter excessive law application - costs of sovereignty - and how state legal decision-makers should take these into account. And I offer several examples drawn from national practice to illustrate this analysis. Finally I discuss connections and extensions to: (1) positive claims about private-international-law practice and the relationship between private-international and corporate law; (2) sticky sovereignty and private-international-law technology, which enables states to better tailor their regulatory claims; (3) camouflaging sovereignty as an alternative to cutting back; (4) delegating sovereignty and the allocation of regulation between the state and private organizations; and (5) nationalism from the perspective of a federal organization regulating conflicts between subsidiary states.

Key concepts: Sovereignty, Political science, Law, International law, Nationalism, State (computer science), Law and economics, Private law

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