2011SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION TRANSACTIONS: SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Daniel Grimm

Open full text 9 citations

Abstract

This Article traces the development of successor liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by outlining the transition from corporate self-regulation to a harsher brand of private enforcement that poses significant challenges for transnational mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”). By holding innocent acquirers liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of target entities, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have created a regulatory environment that is dangerous to efficient corporate transactions. Successor liability for FCPA violations also risks undercutting public and private responses to corporate corruption.Firm transactional due diligence guidelines coupled with a regulatory safe harbor will restore efficiency to the cross-border M&A market while enhancing FCPA compliance.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

This Article traces the development of successor liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by outlining the transition from corporate self-regulation to a harsher brand of private enforcement that poses significant challenges for transnational mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”). By holding innocent acquirers liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of target entities, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have created a regulatory environment that is dangerous to efficient corporate transactions. Successor liability for FCPA violations also risks undercutting public and private responses to corporate corruption.Firm transactional due diligence guidelines coupled with a regulatory safe harbor will restore efficiency to the cross-border M&A market while enhancing FCPA compliance.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 9 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

This Article traces the development of successor liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by outlining the transition from corporate self-regulation to a harsher brand of private enforcement that poses significant challenges for transnational mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”). By holding innocent acquirers liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of target entities, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have created a regulatory environment that is dangerous to efficient corporate transactions. Successor liability for FCPA violations also risks undercutting public and private responses to corporate corruption.Firm transactional due diligence guidelines coupled with a regulatory safe harbor will restore efficiency to the cross-border M&A market while enhancing FCPA compliance.

Key concepts: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Business, Due diligence, Successor cardinal, Liability, Enforcement, Database transaction, Accounting

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION TRANSACTIONS: SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES — Research Paper | ScholarLens