Ballot-cancellation Scheme in E-voting System
Yong-Sork Her, 容碩 許, Kenji Imamoto, 健二 今本, Kouichi Sakurai, 幸一 櫻井
Abstract
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Yong-Sork Her, 容碩 許, Kenji Imamoto, 健二 今本, Kouichi Sakurai, 幸一 櫻井
Abstract
Open-access reader
In this paper, we present an electronic voting (namely e-voting) system based on cryptographic techniques. Recently, some countries have used the e-voting system using the electronic voting device instead of a paper. This e-voting system is the early stage of e-voting which is not an online vote. Many cryptographers have studied the on-line e-voting system based on cryptographic techniques. For a secure e-voting system, it is required some requirements like privacy, unreusability, verifiability, receipt-freeness, and so on. In this paper, (1) we first point out that it can be happened a vote-buying and a vote-coercion in the conventional voting (i.e., the paper voting). (2)We first propose the e-voting system with a ballot-cancellation property. For our e-voting system with ballot-cancellation scheme, we extend the homomorphic property based on r-th residue encryption. Actually, the existed e-voting systems had been overlooked about the ballot-cancellation scheme. There is the reason that the ballot is cancelled according to an election law. For example, if we only authenticate a right of voting which is still valid until Election Day, then sometimes the ballot-cancellation scheme is required for an absentee voter. Usually, the absentee voter casts a ballot before Election Day. If the absentee voters who cast a ballot die or lost the right of casting the ballot before Election Day, the ballots of absentee voters should be cancelled according to the election law. When the ballot is cancelled, the ballotcancellation scheme should satisfy privacy and verifiability.
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In this paper, we present an electronic voting (namely e-voting) system based on cryptographic techniques. Recently, some countries have used the e-voting system using the electronic voting device instead of a paper. This e-voting system is the early stage of e-voting which is not an online vote. Many cryptographers have studied the on-line e-voting system based on cryptographic techniques. For a secure e-voting system, it is required some requirements like privacy, unreusability, verifiability, receipt-freeness, and so on. In this paper, (1) we first point out that it can be happened a vote-buying and a vote-coercion in the conventional voting (i.e., the paper voting). (2)We first propose the e-voting system with a ballot-cancellation property. For our e-voting system with ballot-cancellation scheme, we extend the homomorphic property based on r-th residue encryption. Actually, the existed e-voting systems had been overlooked about the ballot-cancellation scheme. There is the reason that the ballot is cancelled according to an election law. For example, if we only authenticate a right of voting which is still valid until Election Day, then sometimes the ballot-cancellation scheme is required for an absentee voter. Usually, the absentee voter casts a ballot before Election Day. If the absentee voters who cast a ballot die or lost the right of casting the ballot before Election Day, the ballots of absentee voters should be cancelled according to the election law. When the ballot is cancelled, the ballotcancellation scheme should satisfy privacy and verifiability.
Key concepts: Ballot, Voting, Electronic voting, Cardinal voting systems, Computer security, Bullet voting, Disapproval voting, Anti-plurality voting