Hugh R. Jones Lecture at Albany Law School

March 31, 2003 When I went on Court of Appeals, I, like so many other new members of Court, turned for guidance to Judge Jones's 1979 Cardozo Lecture at Bar Association of City of New York, Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making. (1) Rereading Cogitations just now confirmed my initial impression it contained some of best descriptions of qualities of an ideal high court common-law judge. First, quality of utter neutrality. (2) Such a judge approaches a case with predetermined destination ... with no prior commitment to its outcome. (3) Second, quality of institutional loyalty, always keeping in mind the best interests of Court and of public perception of institution as I understand them. (4) Third, quality of applying objective, rigorous because, among other things, Judge Jones believed lilt serves further to reduce risk of result-oriented decision-making. (5) Finally, Cogitations expressed Judge Jones's commitment to common law process of gradual, incremental development of law through case-by-case evolution and refinement. (6) He was convinced from his own judicial experience that judges lack competence or clairvoyance to anticipate implications and ramifications of broad announcements and as well wisdom to formulate them. (7) These thoughts were not novel, as Judge acknowledged, (8) However, I have not seen them any better expressed. Reading Judge Jones's opinions is equally enlightening with respect to other basic characteristics of common law process of judging. Consciously, I suspect, Judge Jones's writings exemplify Grand Style of decision making and opinion writing described by Karl Llewellyn in his last work on judicial process, The Common Law Tradition. (9) I say consciously because Jones served under Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel, (10) who publicly expressed his admiration for Llewellyn's book and acknowledged its influence on his judicial approach. (11) In Jones's opinions, one can see how he skillfully used analogical reasoning in carefully examining fact patterns and weighing holdings of precedents. (12) He then employed rigorous interpretive analysis he mentioned in Cogitations to identify underlying principle, standard or purpose best explaining or unifying precedents at a relatively low level of abstraction or generality. (13) Then, he applied narrow generalization to case at hand to determine what outcome or which of alternative rules of decision best fit with operative facts of case and social realities of type of dispute. (14) Finally, again as he stressed in Cogitations, Judge Jones wrote decision narrowly, focusing on operative facts to limit generality of holding and to instruct bench and bar on its reach. (15) Judge Jones also followed common law tradition in statutory construction and constitutional interpretation. (16) That is, use of analogical reasoning from prior cases construing same provision under similar circumstances and focus on underlying normative purpose of provision, much like search for a unifying principle in precedents in pure common law judging. (17) His style in Constitutional adjudication was much like his mentor at Harvard Law School, Justice Felix Frankfurter, (18) and of Justice John Marshall Harlan. (19) Rereading Cogitations also brought to mind another important factor in considering art of judging: influence of one's professional or personal experience before becoming a judge. In Cogitations, Jones reflected upon what he learned from a highly successful career as a practicing attorney (20)--a counselor at law--bringing to court and conference table his knowledge of impact of decisions upon practical aspects of practice of law. (21) He stressed how imperative clarity and precision in judicial writings were to serving needs of practicing bar. …