攻擊-防禦理論、空權發展與台海穩定
楊仕樂
Abstract
楊仕樂
Abstract
Offense-defense theory claimed when offense has the advantage, wars are more likely; when defense has the advantage, wars are less likely. The evolution of technology, especially the development of air power has made defense less easily, so there are increasing opinions argue that Taiwan should change the defensive orientation to an offensive one. However, this article argues that the development of air power does not greatly reduce the advantage of defense. First, the offensive power of air raid has been overestimated; it is quite difficult to destroy all of the opponent's aircrafis on the ground. It is also very difficult to disable opponent's forces by attacking opponent's command & control centers. Furthermore, an offensive air campaign needs a large air force and sufficient munitions; it is not affordable for a normal country. The land battle of 1991 Gulf War also shows that air power has little to do on the outcome of the land battle. Finally, using strategic bombing as a coercive strategy is very time-consuming. Therefore, Taiwan should not change the defensive strategy.
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Offense-defense theory claimed when offense has the advantage, wars are more likely; when defense has the advantage, wars are less likely. The evolution of technology, especially the development of air power has made defense less easily, so there are increasing opinions argue that Taiwan should change the defensive orientation to an offensive one. However, this article argues that the development of air power does not greatly reduce the advantage of defense. First, the offensive power of air raid has been overestimated; it is quite difficult to destroy all of the opponent's aircrafis on the ground. It is also very difficult to disable opponent's forces by attacking opponent's command & control centers. Furthermore, an offensive air campaign needs a large air force and sufficient munitions; it is not affordable for a normal country. The land battle of 1991 Gulf War also shows that air power has little to do on the outcome of the land battle. Finally, using strategic bombing as a coercive strategy is very time-consuming. Therefore, Taiwan should not change the defensive strategy.
Key concepts: Offensive, Battle, Adversary, Military strategy, Strategic bombing, Political science, Power (physics), Computer security