EC Merger Policy After Airtours and GE/Honeywell
Cento Veljanovski
Abstract
Cento Veljanovski
Abstract
The European Commission's decision to block the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 ignited a wave of criticism from US antitrust authorities and commentators not seen since the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in the mid-90s. This revealed deep differences in the substance and enforcement of EC and US merger laws. At the same time a number of EC Commission's merger decisions were being challenged in the courts, which led to three quick defeats for the Commission which highlight flaws in the its reasoning and enforcement. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of EC and US merger laws and enforcement in the light of the Commission's legal defeats.
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The European Commission's decision to block the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 ignited a wave of criticism from US antitrust authorities and commentators not seen since the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in the mid-90s. This revealed deep differences in the substance and enforcement of EC and US merger laws. At the same time a number of EC Commission's merger decisions were being challenged in the courts, which led to three quick defeats for the Commission which highlight flaws in the its reasoning and enforcement. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of EC and US merger laws and enforcement in the light of the Commission's legal defeats.
Key concepts: Commission, Enforcement, Merger control, European commission, Political science, Law, Criticism, Business