The Evolution of Presidential Authority in War Powers, 1900-1980

In recent years, presidents have claimed to have expansive authority over the deployment of troops and the use of force, and Congress has largely acquiesced to those claims. But it is not clear from existing research exactly how that congressional deference evolved. Previous research has found that Congress is more likely to act to restrict presidential use of war powers if it is governed by a large partisan majority, and if the potential troop deployment is expected to be long and discretionary (Howell and Pevehouse 2007). However, the current literature does not rigorously explain changes over time in that relationship, or how current ideas about war powers developed. To accomplish that task, this paper begins a project of content analyzing members of Congress' statements in the Congressional record about their own and the president's war powers during the twentieth century. It investigates not only what types of incidents cause members of Congress to question the president's legal/constitutional authority, but also what language they use when they do so, and what specific legal and constitutional authorities they cite when they discuss war powers. The paper pursues the hypothesis that members of congress began to express more deference to presidents, by not questioning their legal authority, after World War II, with its expansion of presidential power and the United States' role in the world.