How Tempting is Corruption? - More Bad News About Economists
Björn Frank, Günther G. Schulze
Abstract
Björn Frank, Günther G. Schulze
Abstract
In this paper, we report on an experiment on corruption which investigates various determinants of corruptibility. We find that economics students are significantly more corrupt than others, which is due to self-selection rather than indoctrination. Moreover, our results vary with gender. Also, agents are no less corrupt if rewarded in addition to, and independently of, a possible bribe. Our experiment isolates the influence of self-interest on cooperation from other influences such as risk attitude and expectations regarding the behavior of others.
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In this paper, we report on an experiment on corruption which investigates various determinants of corruptibility. We find that economics students are significantly more corrupt than others, which is due to self-selection rather than indoctrination. Moreover, our results vary with gender. Also, agents are no less corrupt if rewarded in addition to, and independently of, a possible bribe. Our experiment isolates the influence of self-interest on cooperation from other influences such as risk attitude and expectations regarding the behavior of others.
Key concepts: Indoctrination, Language change, Selection (genetic algorithm), Economics, Self-interest, Social psychology, Political science, Positive economics