2015Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative LawOpen access

Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance

Sarah E. Light, Eric W. Orts

Open full text 5 citations

Abstract

Private actors, including business firms and non-governmental organizations, play an essential role in addressing today’s most serious environmental challenges. Yet scholars have not fully recognized the parallels between public environmental law and the standard-setting and enforcement functions of private environmental governance. “Instrument choice” in environmental law scholarship is generally understood to refer to government actors choosing among options from the public law “toolkit,” which includes prescriptive rules, the creation of property rights, the leveraging of markets, and informational regulation. Each of these major public law tools, however, has a parallel in private environmental governance. This Article first provides a descriptive account of these parallels, which highlights two underappreciated tools used by both public and private actors: procurement and insurance for environmental risks. It then considers the normative criteria that should inform choices among instruments by using the example of climate change. The resulting portrait of a multi-tiered, global regime of environmental governance with both public and private options promises greater flexibility and institutional power to address otherwise intractable environmental problems than the traditional paradigm of relying only on public regulation.

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Private actors, including business firms and non-governmental organizations, play an essential role in addressing today’s most serious environmental challenges. Yet scholars have not fully recognized the parallels between public environmental law and the standard-setting and enforcement functions of private environmental governance. “Instrument choice” in environmental law scholarship is generally understood to refer to government actors choosing among options from the public law “toolkit,” which includes prescriptive rules, the creation of property rights, the leveraging of markets, and informational regulation. Each of these major public law tools, however, has a parallel in private environmental governance. This Article first provides a descriptive account of these parallels, which highlights two underappreciated tools used by both public and private actors: procurement and insurance for environmental risks. It then considers the normative criteria that should inform choices among instruments by using the example of climate change. The resulting portrait of a multi-tiered, global regime of environmental governance with both public and private options promises greater flexibility and institutional power to address otherwise intractable environmental problems than the traditional paradigm of relying only on public regulation.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Private actors, including business firms and non-governmental organizations, play an essential role in addressing today’s most serious environmental challenges. Yet scholars have not fully recognized the parallels between public environmental law and the standard-setting and enforcement functions of private environmental governance. “Instrument choice” in environmental law scholarship is generally understood to refer to government actors choosing among options from the public law “toolkit,” which includes prescriptive rules, the creation of property rights, the leveraging of markets, and informational regulation. Each of these major public law tools, however, has a parallel in private environmental governance. This Article first provides a descriptive account of these parallels, which highlights two underappreciated tools used by both public and private actors: procurement and insurance for environmental risks. It then considers the normative criteria that should inform choices among instruments by using the example of climate change. The resulting portrait of a multi-tiered, global regime of environmental governance with both public and private options promises greater flexibility and institutional power to address otherwise intractable environmental problems than the traditional paradigm of relying only on public regulation.

Key concepts: Parallels, Corporate governance, Environmental governance, Political science, Public administration, Business, Economics, Finance

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance — Research Paper | ScholarLens