A U.S. Strategy for Africa through 2010

Turmoil in the Soviet Union, continuing decline in black Africa, and the persistent United States Government budget deficit have underlined the need for a re-examination of U.S. national interests in sub-Saharan Africa, and the threats to those interests. If this re-evaluation confirms that both the nation's interests and threats have diminished, the United States can probably reduce its embassy staffing and aid levels over the next few decades. Proponents of a more activist U.S. Government stance toward sub-Saharan Africa often justify their position by pointing to enduring U.S. strategic interests in Africa, Soviet meddling on the continent, and the burgeoning needs of Africa's sick and hungry poor. Those who counsel less U.S. Government involvement in black Africa acknowledge the need for a generous response to humanitarian concerns, do not concede that Soviet perniciousness poses a threat to the United States, and see the continent as marginally significant to U.S. peacetime strategy. At stake in the dispute between these two opposing viewpoints are U.S. aid levels; staffing levels for diplomatic, information, and intelligence collection elements in U.S. embassies in Africa; and a range of policy decisions on the extent to which the United States should try to influence Africa's course between now and 2010.