Future of arms control
Robert Johansen
Abstract
Robert Johansen
Abstract
The author, at the time of this article, noted that the Reagan administration's first-term policies severely limit the future prospects for arms control. He felt the bargaining-from-strength posture would aim for arms control agreements that give the appearance of a bold stroke for peace, but produce few if any constraints on the most destabilizing trends in military technology. While noting that the first 16 months of the administration produced no new proposals, he observes that the ones that were finally advanced were so one-sided as to be non-negotiable. He discusses the lost opportunities, erosion of existing arms constraints, the Reagan doctrine as a fatal blow to arms control and the demise of arms control, while suggesting a new approach. Finally, he proposes a more reactive role for Congress and the public to pressure the administration for more security-enhancing practices.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
The author, at the time of this article, noted that the Reagan administration's first-term policies severely limit the future prospects for arms control. He felt the bargaining-from-strength posture would aim for arms control agreements that give the appearance of a bold stroke for peace, but produce few if any constraints on the most destabilizing trends in military technology. While noting that the first 16 months of the administration produced no new proposals, he observes that the ones that were finally advanced were so one-sided as to be non-negotiable. He discusses the lost opportunities, erosion of existing arms constraints, the Reagan doctrine as a fatal blow to arms control and the demise of arms control, while suggesting a new approach. Finally, he proposes a more reactive role for Congress and the public to pressure the administration for more security-enhancing practices.
Key concepts: Demise, Arms control, Doctrine, Administration (probate law), Control (management), Political science, Cold war, Law and economics