Infantry Behind the Lines-Still a Viable Concept?

This monograph addresses the viability of the use of infantry forces in the deep interdiction role. Light infantry doctrine holds that infantry can add to the interdiction effort by striking enemy combat support, combat service support, and command and control assets, as well as enemy reserve combat forces. However, American commanders have been reluctant to use their infantry forces in this role. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the potential for future use of infantry interdiction operations, in light of the recent revisions to Army doctrine, as espoused in FM 100-5, Operations. A review of the historical use of infantry forces in the deep interdiction role establishes a framework for the analysis of potential future application of the operation. The experiences of the 32nd Russian Cossack Division in August 1941, the 6th Division of the North Korean People's Army in August, 1950, and the U.S.10th Mountain Division (Light) during REFORGER 90 show that infantry forces can have significant operational effects, though at high cost. This monograph presents a theory that postulates that the most effective employment of infantry forces in the deep role is as the synchronizer of the interdiction effort against the enemy command and control system. This is consistent with the new emphasis on synchronization of the simultaneous application of force throughout the depth of the enemy. However, there are significant shortcomings associated with the coordination requirements for the force in this role. Most significant are the lack of sufficient long-range communications systems, a shortage of terminal guidance equipment, and severe shortfalls in the area of medical support. The last shortcoming is especially important given the recent emphasis on achieving quick, decisive results with minimal casualties. The fundamental conclusion of the paper is that infantry forces should be used in the deep interdiction role only as a last resort. Other means of attacking deep can achieve many of the desired results without being directed by infantry forces in the enemy rear. Though these means may be less efficient and effective without the infantry force as the synchronizer, the relative risks of the loss of the infantry force are too great, and the coordination requirements too difficult, for the commander to send his infantry deep. However, several recommendations are made to enable commanders to use this tool in the future if the need arises.