Deep Operations in Airland Battle Doctrine: The Employment of U.S. Ground Forces in Deep Operational Maneuver

In Soviet Army doctrine, deep operations has been a long time in development and is manifested today in the Operational Maneuver Group. As the name implies, the Soviet emphasis is at the operational level. The mission of an OMG would be to penetrate enemy defenses, raiding deep to destroy vital targets and seize key objectives while avoiding decisive engagement. It is a ground maneuver concept conducted by a carefully tailored, ad hoc military formation controlled by the operational commander. In the U.S. Army deep operations is a relatively new doctrinal development; the emphasis is on operational fires and electronic warfare rather than on ground maneuver. The Soviets recognize the threat to their follow-on echelons posed by high technology weaponry, however, and if the Warsaw Pact invades it will most likely be a surprise attack by only forward deployed forces pushed up into a single echelon. This suggests that the NATO strategy, based in part on timely warning and FOFA, might be obsolete, or might not be an effective deterrent. It also suggests that on a central European battlefield characterized by meeting engagements between large units, deep operational maneuver might have an increased significance in the outcome of the war. The question that this paper seeks to answer is what could the U.S. Army gain by having a concept for deep operational maneuver by ground forces in a mid- to high-intensity war? To answer this question I (1) analyze Soviet deep operations theory to determine how their concept developed and what they expect an OMG to accomplish, (2) evaluate AirLand Battle doctrine and determine the current role of deep operations, (3) compare Soviet developments to U.S. capabilities to determine the potential of U.S. ground forces in deep operations, and (4) determine if a concept for deep operational maneuver by ground forces could benefit the U.S. Army. A NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario is used as a model within which to analyze the problem. A surprise attack is assumed. This study concluded that an operational expansion of the current deep operations concept could benefit the Army by providing a model that commanders could use to plan and train for bold maneuver of large units over long distances. It would also be an excellent vehicle for preparing them to conduct engagements in a fluid, uncertain environment. An explicit framework for the employment of ground forces in deep operations to achieve operational aims would fit well into existing doctrine, and could help deter enemy attack. Three implications that result from this study are that: (1) brigades might be the best formation to maintain as self-supporting tactical entities with divisions being primarily warfighting headquarters that can receive whatever mix of brigades, by type, that the situation calls for; (2) airmechanization, a combined arms, maneuver oriented concept that can be applied at the operational level, is a useful construct when considering deep operations; and (3) the Army should reconsider its Aviation Modernization Plan--pursuing the development of an advanced cargo aircraft designed to maintain air lines of support to maneuver units might be more prudent than a commitment to LHX at the expense of other systems and programs.