The research of the enterprise cooperation strategy under different carbon emissions' policies
Dandan Wang, Dong Mu, Qian Zhang
Abstract
Dandan Wang, Dong Mu, Qian Zhang
Abstract
The problem of the global climate change significantly attracts the attention of the world, and all countries are trying their bests to reduce emissions of the carbon dioxide, which is imperative. In the process of low carbon supply chain, this article considers two kinds of carbon emission reduction policies: the carbon tax and the carbon trading, and builds game model of carbon emission reduction in both cases: the supply chain cooperation and non-cooperation. The research results show that no matter under the carbon tax policy or under the carbon trading policy, the optimal carbon emission reduction rate of the manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain cooperation situation is not necessarily higher than that in the supply chain non-cooperation situation, the results also show that whether the supply chain enterprise should choose to cooperate with each other or not depends on the carbon tax rate and the price of carbon trading set by the government. The conclusion above can provide a theoretical support for the government to set reasonable carbon tax rate and carbon trading price and can also provide reference for enterprises to choose the appropriate cooperation mode.
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The problem of the global climate change significantly attracts the attention of the world, and all countries are trying their bests to reduce emissions of the carbon dioxide, which is imperative. In the process of low carbon supply chain, this article considers two kinds of carbon emission reduction policies: the carbon tax and the carbon trading, and builds game model of carbon emission reduction in both cases: the supply chain cooperation and non-cooperation. The research results show that no matter under the carbon tax policy or under the carbon trading policy, the optimal carbon emission reduction rate of the manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain cooperation situation is not necessarily higher than that in the supply chain non-cooperation situation, the results also show that whether the supply chain enterprise should choose to cooperate with each other or not depends on the carbon tax rate and the price of carbon trading set by the government. The conclusion above can provide a theoretical support for the government to set reasonable carbon tax rate and carbon trading price and can also provide reference for enterprises to choose the appropriate cooperation mode.
Key concepts: Carbon tax, Supply chain, Greenhouse gas, Government (linguistics), Business, Carbon fibers, Environmental economics, Emissions trading