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Improving the Aircraft Readiness of the Marine Aviation Combat Element Deployed to the Mediterranean Sea

Knapp, Joseph H.

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Abstract

Although shipboard MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) Readiness in the Mediterranean currently meets and exceeds CNO goals, there remains room for improvement. Significant logistics training and experience deficiencies exist within the ACE, supporting MALS, and aboard LHA/LHD class ships. Ongoing disputes regarding control of the MALS detachment aviation supply officer also result in poor ACE-ship relations. Aviation logistics oversight of the LHA/LHD by two type commanders (COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVSURFLANT) creates confusion and sometimes compromises aviation interests. Finally, although split-ARG offers the MEU operational flexibility, it detracts from aircraft readiness by dividing scarce manpower, equipment, and spare parts between ships. to solve these problems, the Navy and Marine Corps must overhaul existing training and experience prerequisites for deploying personnel to ensure they are qualified and capable of providing optimum support. Formally placing the MALS detachment aviation supply officer under the operational control of the ship will also improve supply support and ACE-ship relations. Additionally, placing the LHA/LHD under COMNAVAIRLANT control will ensure that aviation issues receive the utmost priority. finally, if our warfighters plan to continue split-ARG operations, they must formalize the requirement in order for supporting activities to gain the additional materiel required to effectively conduct them.

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What this paper is about

Although shipboard MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) Readiness in the Mediterranean currently meets and exceeds CNO goals, there remains room for improvement. Significant logistics training and experience deficiencies exist within the ACE, supporting MALS, and aboard LHA/LHD class ships. Ongoing disputes regarding control of the MALS detachment aviation supply officer also result in poor ACE-ship relations. Aviation logistics oversight of the LHA/LHD by two type commanders (COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVSURFLANT) creates confusion and sometimes compromises aviation interests. Finally, although split-ARG offers the MEU operational flexibility, it detracts from aircraft readiness by dividing scarce manpower, equipment, and spare parts between ships. to solve these problems, the Navy and Marine Corps must overhaul existing training and experience prerequisites for deploying personnel to ensure they are qualified and capable of providing optimum support. Formally placing the MALS detachment aviation supply officer under the operational control of the ship will also improve supply support and ACE-ship relations. Additionally, placing the LHA/LHD under COMNAVAIRLANT control will ensure that aviation issues receive the utmost priority. finally, if our warfighters plan to continue split-ARG operations, they must formalize the requirement in order for supporting activities to gain the additional materiel required to effectively conduct them.

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Available abstract

Although shipboard MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) Readiness in the Mediterranean currently meets and exceeds CNO goals, there remains room for improvement. Significant logistics training and experience deficiencies exist within the ACE, supporting MALS, and aboard LHA/LHD class ships. Ongoing disputes regarding control of the MALS detachment aviation supply officer also result in poor ACE-ship relations. Aviation logistics oversight of the LHA/LHD by two type commanders (COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVSURFLANT) creates confusion and sometimes compromises aviation interests. Finally, although split-ARG offers the MEU operational flexibility, it detracts from aircraft readiness by dividing scarce manpower, equipment, and spare parts between ships. to solve these problems, the Navy and Marine Corps must overhaul existing training and experience prerequisites for deploying personnel to ensure they are qualified and capable of providing optimum support. Formally placing the MALS detachment aviation supply officer under the operational control of the ship will also improve supply support and ACE-ship relations. Additionally, placing the LHA/LHD under COMNAVAIRLANT control will ensure that aviation issues receive the utmost priority. finally, if our warfighters plan to continue split-ARG operations, they must formalize the requirement in order for supporting activities to gain the additional materiel required to effectively conduct them.

Key concepts: Aviation, Navy, Aeronautics, Flexibility (engineering), Spare part, Engineering, Officer, Control (management)

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