2004•bepress Legal RepositoryRequires access

Tax Competition: harmful to whom?

Michael Littlewood

Open publisher page 11 citations

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the theory that it is both desirable and feasible to prevent less-developed countries from operating preferential tax regimes (that is, offering tax incentives) as a means of attracting foreign investment.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The aim of this paper is to examine the theory that it is both desirable and feasible to prevent less-developed countries from operating preferential tax regimes (that is, offering tax incentives) as a means of attracting foreign investment.

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OpenAlex reports 11 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the theory that it is both desirable and feasible to prevent less-developed countries from operating preferential tax regimes (that is, offering tax incentives) as a means of attracting foreign investment.

Key concepts: Competition (biology), Business, International trade, International economics, Economics, Ecology, Biology

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