The Use of Circuit Evaluation Techniques for Secure Computation
Oleg Selajev
Abstract
Oleg Selajev
Abstract
Secure two-party computation problem is about two parties that want to compute some function of their private inputs in a way that other party won’t learn it. We describe a general way to perform secure two-party computation of a function specified as a boolean circuit, which was proposed by A.A. Yao in 1982. This method is named Yao garbled circuit evaluation and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We present a new efficient protocol for secure two-party computation Circus, that is secure against malicious adversary in consistency model. Consistency model implies that either both parties will receive correct output and persist privacy of their inputs or a honest party will know, that is was cheated and that adversary potentially have learnt 1 bit of other party’s input value. We specify all necessary sub-protocols and their security requirements and prove security of Circus in malicious environment.
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Secure two-party computation problem is about two parties that want to compute some function of their private inputs in a way that other party won’t learn it. We describe a general way to perform secure two-party computation of a function specified as a boolean circuit, which was proposed by A.A. Yao in 1982. This method is named Yao garbled circuit evaluation and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We present a new efficient protocol for secure two-party computation Circus, that is secure against malicious adversary in consistency model. Consistency model implies that either both parties will receive correct output and persist privacy of their inputs or a honest party will know, that is was cheated and that adversary potentially have learnt 1 bit of other party’s input value. We specify all necessary sub-protocols and their security requirements and prove security of Circus in malicious environment.
Key concepts: Secure two-party computation, Computer science, Adversary, Secure multi-party computation, Consistency (knowledge bases), Computer security, Computation, Security parameter