The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine

The majority of the literature examining the European Union's (EU) ability to encourage po- litical and economic reform only considers its influence on countries involved in the ac- cession process; few have examined its impact on non-accession countries. Therefore, in this paper I assess the ability of the EU to promote reform outside of the accession process and develop a theory explaining a state's compliance with or rejection of EU pressure to reform. Through comparing and contrasting the cases of Belarus and Ukraine, I determine that a combination of domestic elite preferences and the strength of EU pressure - a func- tion of the degree of unity among the EU members on the issue - influence the likelihood of a state's compliance with EU pressure. The degree of economic dependency, public opinion about the EU, and severity of inter-elite conflict all affect elite preferences. INTRODUCTION majority of the literature examining the European Union's (EU) ability to encourage political and economic reform only considers its influence on countries involved in the accession process; few have examined its impact on non-accession countries. Does the allure of EU membership promote reform even when there is a low probability of membership? More broadly, what determines a state's compliance or rejection of EU pressure for reform? The combination of the rewards (or sanctions) offered by the EU and the receptivity of the domestic elite to EU pressure determine a state's compliance with EU demands. The nature of the rewards, such as trade deals, and the clarity of EU policy affect the cost/benefit calculations of elites regarding reform. However, their cal- culations take into account not only relations with the EU, but also the domestic politi- cal and economic situation. Along with considering the nature of the rewards, elites also contemplate the degree of their economic dependency on the EU, the usefulness of the EU as an ally in internal political battles, and the degree of public support. If the country is economically dependent on the EU, the EU helps strengthen the elites' po- sition in internal political battles, and the public is generally supportive of the EU, then at least some domestic elites are more likely to adopt suggested reforms.