How Big is the Canvas for Operational Art

This monograph addresses the theory of operational art and discusses where it can be applied. As American military forces prepare to enter into the 21st Century it is clear that they will be involved in a wide range of operations. The collapse of the bi-polar world with the end of the Cold War has increased the potential for U.S. troop deployments on Operations Other Than War (OOTW). These deployments require a relevant theory which links tactical actions to strategic goals. The theory that provided guidance for our Cold War focus in the 1980’s should be updated and expanded to carry on in the future. A review of the historical development of the theory of operational art shows that early developments were a result of the stalemate and bloodshed of World War I. Russian theorists Triandafillov and Svechin developed their theories within the context of the Soviet way of war. This emphasis on major land battles across the continent of Europe was truly appropriate for their future and World War II. American military proponents adapted these theories of operational art in the early 1980's as the U.S. sought to deal with the demand of a potential war with the Soviet Union. These theories fit well in the context of the times. A new strategic concept calls for these theories to be reexamined to determine if they are truly theoretical models that are applicable across a broad spectrum or narrower doctrinal models that have existed as theories in the relatively stable bi-polar world. This monograph examines the theory of operational art to determine a suitable model for the U.S. military. It establishes a broad framework that allows operational art to exist throughout the spectrum of conflict. While at each level of conflict the employment of operational art may require a tailored set of tools, the fundamental principles remain the same. Operational art should provide the link between strategy and tactics that provides continuity and unity of effort in any military action. The fundamental conclusion of the paper is that U.S. theories of operational art must be modified to provide a coherent model that is applicable across the spectrum of military operations. The character of military operations in the future require a solid foundation that will provide direction to tactical actions. The lack of a single integrating theory will hamper our ability to achieve lasting strategic results with today's diverse military operations.