Study on Methods of Interest Allocation for Participant Enterprises in Joint Distribution
Zhicai Juan, Zhongning Fu, Wu Fang
Abstract
Zhicai Juan, Zhongning Fu, Wu Fang
Abstract
Joint distribution is a cooperative distribution mode. It has become a trend of logistics distribution due to its inherent characteristics and advantages. In practice, the participant enterprises are quite concerned about the allocation of income and cost caused by their cooperation. So the allocation method will play an important role in the successful implementation of joint distribution. This paper applies the theory of cooperation game and bargaining game to calculate the cost shares that the investigated logistics firms should undertake. By comparing and analyzing the algorithm hypotheses and allocation results of Nash bargaining solution, simple proration, and evaluation approach of cooperation game, it can be concluded that evaluation approach of cooperation game can better reflect the principle of equity and rationality than the other two methods. In the end, this paper considers evaluation approach as the rule of interest allocation in joint distribution
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Joint distribution is a cooperative distribution mode. It has become a trend of logistics distribution due to its inherent characteristics and advantages. In practice, the participant enterprises are quite concerned about the allocation of income and cost caused by their cooperation. So the allocation method will play an important role in the successful implementation of joint distribution. This paper applies the theory of cooperation game and bargaining game to calculate the cost shares that the investigated logistics firms should undertake. By comparing and analyzing the algorithm hypotheses and allocation results of Nash bargaining solution, simple proration, and evaluation approach of cooperation game, it can be concluded that evaluation approach of cooperation game can better reflect the principle of equity and rationality than the other two methods. In the end, this paper considers evaluation approach as the rule of interest allocation in joint distribution
Key concepts: Rationality, Distribution (mathematics), Bargaining problem, Game theory, Joint (building), Cooperative game theory, Computer science, Equity (law)