Moral Reasoning about Real-Life Dilemmas: Paradox in Research Using the Defining Issues Test
Steven A. Wygant
Abstract
Steven A. Wygant
Abstract
Cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning have been criticized for ignoring contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, therefore, failing to enhance understanding of real-life moral reasoning. Three studies are reported: (a) Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1988) and the Personal Moral Dilemma Inventory (PMDI), created to assess real-life moral reasoning; (b) the DIT and PMDI were completed using moral role-plays; (c) participants described the response sets resulting from these role-plays. High- and low-principled reasoners' responses to real-life moral dilemmas were not significantly different. Also, it was harder to distinguish moral from immoral responses to DIT dilemmas than similar responses to real-life dilemmas. Findings support the argument that cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning fail to address everyday moral concerns.
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Cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning have been criticized for ignoring contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, therefore, failing to enhance understanding of real-life moral reasoning. Three studies are reported: (a) Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1988) and the Personal Moral Dilemma Inventory (PMDI), created to assess real-life moral reasoning; (b) the DIT and PMDI were completed using moral role-plays; (c) participants described the response sets resulting from these role-plays. High- and low-principled reasoners' responses to real-life moral dilemmas were not significantly different. Also, it was harder to distinguish moral from immoral responses to DIT dilemmas than similar responses to real-life dilemmas. Findings support the argument that cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning fail to address everyday moral concerns.
Key concepts: Moral dilemma, Moral reasoning, Psychology, Social cognitive theory of morality, Moral disengagement, Defining Issues Test, Moral development, Everyday life