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1997•Journal of Economic TheoryOpen access

Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices

Michael Peters, Sergei Severinov

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Abstract

In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud.55(1988), 71–84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica61(1993), 1281–1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D44, D82.

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What this paper is about

In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud.55(1988), 71–84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica61(1993), 1281–1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D44, D82.

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Available abstract

In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud.55(1988), 71–84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica61(1993), 1281–1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D44, D82.

Key concepts: Common value auction, Competition (biology), Microeconomics, Economics, Simple (philosophy), Forward auction, Mathematical economics, Auction theory

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