A continuous version of the prisoner's dilemma
T Tom Verhoeff
Abstract
T Tom Verhoeff
Abstract
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a non-zero-sum discrete two-player game. It is often used to study social phenomena like cooperation. In this article we describe and analyze a continuous version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The continuous version may provide further insights in the phenomenon of cooperation because it allows new types of strategies.
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The Prisoner's Dilemma is a non-zero-sum discrete two-player game. It is often used to study social phenomena like cooperation. In this article we describe and analyze a continuous version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The continuous version may provide further insights in the phenomenon of cooperation because it allows new types of strategies.
Key concepts: Superrationality, Prisoner's dilemma, Dilemma, Mathematical economics, Phenomenon, Computer science, Game theory, Economics