Combining Pricing Bands with Price Cap Regulation
Kevin M. Currier
Abstract
Open-access reader
Kevin M. Currier
Abstract
Open-access reader
Within the context of natural monopoly regulation, price cap schemes are often combined with price bands in which a maximum percentage by which the price in a market can be raised or lowered is stipulated. In this note, we examine the feasibility of combining average-revenue-lagged and Laspeyres price cap regulation with price band regulation. Specifically, we study the impact of pricing bands on the known efficiency properties of these two price cap schemes.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Within the context of natural monopoly regulation, price cap schemes are often combined with price bands in which a maximum percentage by which the price in a market can be raised or lowered is stipulated. In this note, we examine the feasibility of combining average-revenue-lagged and Laspeyres price cap regulation with price band regulation. Specifically, we study the impact of pricing bands on the known efficiency properties of these two price cap schemes.
Key concepts: Economics, Revenue, Monopoly, Context (archaeology), Mid price, Limit price, Reservation price, Econometrics