Luigi Filippini
Abstract
In a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
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In a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Duopoly, Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Economics, Microeconomics, Bertrand competition, Business