2003Unpublished venueRequires access

Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-ciphertext security

Arun Sahai

Open publisher page 586 citations

Abstract

We introduce the notion of non-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems. We show how to transform any ordinary NIZK proof system into one that has strong non-malleability properties. We then show that the elegant encryption scheme of Naor and Yung (1990) can be made secure against the strongest form of chosen-ciphertext attack by using a non-malleable NIZK proof instead of a standard NIZK proof. Our encryption scheme is simple to describe and works in the standard cryptographic model under, general assumptions. The encryption scheme can be realized assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

We introduce the notion of non-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems. We show how to transform any ordinary NIZK proof system into one that has strong non-malleability properties. We then show that the elegant encryption scheme of Naor and Yung (1990) can be made secure against the strongest form of chosen-ciphertext attack by using a non-malleable NIZK proof instead of a standard NIZK proof. Our encryption scheme is simple to describe and works in the standard cryptographic model under, general assumptions. The encryption scheme can be realized assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations.

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OpenAlex reports 586 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

We introduce the notion of non-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems. We show how to transform any ordinary NIZK proof system into one that has strong non-malleability properties. We then show that the elegant encryption scheme of Naor and Yung (1990) can be made secure against the strongest form of chosen-ciphertext attack by using a non-malleable NIZK proof instead of a standard NIZK proof. Our encryption scheme is simple to describe and works in the standard cryptographic model under, general assumptions. The encryption scheme can be realized assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations.

Key concepts: Ciphertext indistinguishability, Ciphertext, Zero-knowledge proof, Malleability, Encryption, Cryptography, Semantic security, Scheme (mathematics)

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