2009•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, 'Toxic Asset' Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions

Paul Klemperer

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Key concepts: Common value auction, Market liquidity, Business, Vickrey auction, Variable (mathematics), Auction theory, Product (mathematics), Reverse auction

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A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, 'Toxic Asset' Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions — Research Paper | ScholarLens