2007•The Economic JournalRequires access

Equilibrium in the Jungle

Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein

Open publisher page 192 citations

Abstract

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.

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What this paper is about

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.

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OpenAlex reports 192 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.

Key concepts: Jungle, Exchange economy, Coercion (linguistics), Economics, Simple (philosophy), Power (physics), Economy, Microeconomics

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