Look before you LEAP
S.M. Jr. Keeny
Abstract
S.M. Jr. Keeny
Abstract
Almost unnoticed, the Clinton administration is quietly seeking to persuade Russia to join in a reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that could have extremely adverse consequences for U.S. security. Under the guise of {open_quotes}clarifying{close_quotes} the dividing line between strategic ballistic missile defenses, which are covered by the treaty, and tactical defenses so permissive that systems with significant capability against strategic missiles could legally be deployed. Consequently, systems that also violate other treaty provisions, including the ban on mobility, could be deployed in unlimited numbers. Opening this gaping loophole in the ABM Treaty could block further reductions in strategic warheads below START II levels. This new barrier to reducing nuclear arsenals would undercut U.S. efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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Almost unnoticed, the Clinton administration is quietly seeking to persuade Russia to join in a reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that could have extremely adverse consequences for U.S. security. Under the guise of {open_quotes}clarifying{close_quotes} the dividing line between strategic ballistic missile defenses, which are covered by the treaty, and tactical defenses so permissive that systems with significant capability against strategic missiles could legally be deployed. Consequently, systems that also violate other treaty provisions, including the ban on mobility, could be deployed in unlimited numbers. Opening this gaping loophole in the ABM Treaty could block further reductions in strategic warheads below START II levels. This new barrier to reducing nuclear arsenals would undercut U.S. efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Key concepts: Arms control, Treaty, Nuclear weapon, Ballistic missile, Reinterpretation, Political science, Computer security, Law and economics