Experimental games for the design of reputation management systems
Claudia Keser
Abstract
Claudia Keser
Abstract
Trust between people engaging in economic transactions affects the economic growth of their community. Reputation management systems, such as the Feedback Forum of eBay Inc., can increase the trust level of the participants. We show in this paper that experimental economics can be used in a controlled laboratory environment to measure trust and trust enhancement. Specifically, we present an experimental study that quantifies the increase in trust produced by two versions of a reputation management system. We also discuss some emerging issues in the design of reputation management systems.
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Trust between people engaging in economic transactions affects the economic growth of their community. Reputation management systems, such as the Feedback Forum of eBay Inc., can increase the trust level of the participants. We show in this paper that experimental economics can be used in a controlled laboratory environment to measure trust and trust enhancement. Specifically, we present an experimental study that quantifies the increase in trust produced by two versions of a reputation management system. We also discuss some emerging issues in the design of reputation management systems.
Key concepts: Reputation, Reputation management, Trust management (information system), Reputation system, Measure (data warehouse), Computer science, Knowledge management, Business