2000British Journal of Social PsychologyRequires access

The primacy of self‐referent information in perceptions of social consensus

Russell W. Clement, Joachim Israel Krueger

Open publisher page 117 citations

Abstract

People's own responses to a social stimulus (i.e. whether they endorse it or reject it) predict how they expect other people to respond (consensus estimates). This correlation has long been accepted as evidence for social projection. There has been little direct evidence, however, for the assumption that self-referent judgments shape judgments about others. Supporting the projection model, Expt 1 shows that self-referent information is more accessible than consensus estimates. Once they have been made, people's own endorsements and rejections of a stimulus facilitate consensus estimates. In turn, consensus estimates facilitate endorsements (but less so). Judgments about the physical properties of the stimulus facilitate neither type of social judgment. Supporting the view that projection is egocentric, Expt 2 shows that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endorsements than on the endorsements made by another individual. This self-other difference does not depend on whose endorsements are revealed first or on whether the other person is anonymous or individual.

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What this paper is about

People's own responses to a social stimulus (i.e. whether they endorse it or reject it) predict how they expect other people to respond (consensus estimates). This correlation has long been accepted as evidence for social projection. There has been little direct evidence, however, for the assumption that self-referent judgments shape judgments about others. Supporting the projection model, Expt 1 shows that self-referent information is more accessible than consensus estimates. Once they have been made, people's own endorsements and rejections of a stimulus facilitate consensus estimates. In turn, consensus estimates facilitate endorsements (but less so). Judgments about the physical properties of the stimulus facilitate neither type of social judgment. Supporting the view that projection is egocentric, Expt 2 shows that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endorsements than on the endorsements made by another individual. This self-other difference does not depend on whose endorsements are revealed first or on whether the other person is anonymous or individual.

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Available abstract

People's own responses to a social stimulus (i.e. whether they endorse it or reject it) predict how they expect other people to respond (consensus estimates). This correlation has long been accepted as evidence for social projection. There has been little direct evidence, however, for the assumption that self-referent judgments shape judgments about others. Supporting the projection model, Expt 1 shows that self-referent information is more accessible than consensus estimates. Once they have been made, people's own endorsements and rejections of a stimulus facilitate consensus estimates. In turn, consensus estimates facilitate endorsements (but less so). Judgments about the physical properties of the stimulus facilitate neither type of social judgment. Supporting the view that projection is egocentric, Expt 2 shows that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endorsements than on the endorsements made by another individual. This self-other difference does not depend on whose endorsements are revealed first or on whether the other person is anonymous or individual.

Key concepts: Referent, Psychology, Perception, Social psychology, Social perception, Stimulus (psychology), Cognitive psychology, Neuroscience

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