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2002•Unpublished venueRequires access

Exploring the BAN approach to protocol analysis

Einar Snekkenes

Open publisher page 32 citations

Abstract

The BAN approach to analysis of cryptographic protocols (M. Burrows et al., 1988) transforms a correctness requirement into a proof obligation of a formal belief logic. It is shown that the BAN protocol annotation rules make flaws due solely to protocol step permutation undetectable by the BAN logic. This is illustrated by a short example. In the style of BAN logic, the author defines the concept of a terminating idealized protocol. BAN logic has been used to prove the correctness of an insecure protocol (D. Nessett, 1990). The author shows that this protocol belongs to the class of nonterminating protocols.>

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The BAN approach to analysis of cryptographic protocols (M. Burrows et al., 1988) transforms a correctness requirement into a proof obligation of a formal belief logic. It is shown that the BAN protocol annotation rules make flaws due solely to protocol step permutation undetectable by the BAN logic. This is illustrated by a short example. In the style of BAN logic, the author defines the concept of a terminating idealized protocol. BAN logic has been used to prove the correctness of an insecure protocol (D. Nessett, 1990). The author shows that this protocol belongs to the class of nonterminating protocols.>

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OpenAlex reports 32 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

The BAN approach to analysis of cryptographic protocols (M. Burrows et al., 1988) transforms a correctness requirement into a proof obligation of a formal belief logic. It is shown that the BAN protocol annotation rules make flaws due solely to protocol step permutation undetectable by the BAN logic. This is illustrated by a short example. In the style of BAN logic, the author defines the concept of a terminating idealized protocol. BAN logic has been used to prove the correctness of an insecure protocol (D. Nessett, 1990). The author shows that this protocol belongs to the class of nonterminating protocols.>

Key concepts: Correctness, Protocol (science), Computer science, Cryptographic protocol, Theoretical computer science, Cryptography, Permutation (music), Programming language

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