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The ε core of a repeater n-person stochastic cooperative game

Hongxin Bai, Zuofeng Gao, Suting Zhang, Yong-bo Yu

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Abstract

In this paper, because of the core for game is usually empty , based on the core of the stochastic cooperative game1 and the core of the n-person repeated stochastic cooperative game5, we define the core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the -person repeated stochastic cooperative game. Thus, we recuperate the defect in theory that the core is empty usual. And we introduce some characters and properties about core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the n -person repeated stochastic cooperative game.

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What this paper is about

In this paper, because of the core for game is usually empty , based on the core of the stochastic cooperative game1 and the core of the n-person repeated stochastic cooperative game5, we define the core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the -person repeated stochastic cooperative game. Thus, we recuperate the defect in theory that the core is empty usual. And we introduce some characters and properties about core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the n -person repeated stochastic cooperative game.

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Available abstract

In this paper, because of the core for game is usually empty , based on the core of the stochastic cooperative game1 and the core of the n-person repeated stochastic cooperative game5, we define the core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the -person repeated stochastic cooperative game. Thus, we recuperate the defect in theory that the core is empty usual. And we introduce some characters and properties about core of the stochastic cooperative game and the core of the n -person repeated stochastic cooperative game.

Key concepts: Core (optical fiber), Bondareva–Shapley theorem, Repeated game, Computer science, Mathematical economics, Game theory, Stochastic process, Mathematics

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