2011•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information

Bruno H. Strulovici

Open full text 17 citations

Abstract

This record does not include an abstract. Use the full-text link above if available.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

An abstract is not available in the OpenAlex record for this paper.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 17 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Key concepts: Moral hazard, Private information retrieval, Business, Information asymmetry, Law and economics, Adverse selection, Actuarial science, Economics

Back to paper search Browse research topics Original source

Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information — Research Paper | ScholarLens