Tokyo Confronts Terror

IN THE AFTERMATH of September 11 terror attacks on United States, observers of Japanese politics were astonished to see decisiveness with which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi acted to lend Japanese support to U.S. war on terrorism. Using remarkably tough language, Koizumi called attacks -- in which 24 Japanese perished -- unforgivable and followed with a seven-point emergency plan committing Japanese military to support U.S. activities in Afghanistan. Most notably, he pushed forcefully for dispatch of members of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, largely aboard high-tech Aegis cruisers, to Indian Ocean to provide intelligence support. These actions stood in stark contrast to decades of Japanese pacifism and public ambivalence about nation's military stance, and Koizumi certainly expected to meet serious resistance from dovish members of Japanese government. Perhaps for this reason, popular, self-styled maverick Koizumi seemed especially eager to push through debat e quickly so that Japan would avoid kind of harsh international criticism that had attended nation's tardiness in accepting any role in Persian Gulf War. Although Japan ultimately made largest financial contribution of any nation to that conflict, critics both at home and abroad referred derisively to nation's checkbook diplomacy and its unwillingness to risk lives even to support collective security arrangements. Although some argued that Japan would never be a normal country, Koizumi's determination and Japanese Diet's relatively speedy passage of his legislation together indicated that Japan had done seemingly impossible. But if war on terrorism really is a new kind of war, experts on Japan may need to rethink what this apparent shift really means. Something is and has been happening in Japanese debates over international security, and we may yet witness a sea-change in nation's policies toward security of Asia-Pacific region. What these recent moves will not do, however, is guarantee a change in Japanese thinking about terrorism and how to confront it. This, more than any specific Japanese failure to support American actions in Afghanistan, may genuinely endanger alliance in ways that no one in Washington or Tokyo has addressed. If U.S. war on terrorism expands to Pacific Rim -- as most analysts now believe it will -- United States will need and expect support that Japan will find difficult to provide. The nation is not prepared to engage in a genuine counterterrorist campaign, and its eagerness to support United States may begin to backfire when it becomes clear what a war on terrorism mea ns. The shape of security treaty THE STORY OF U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is familiar if peculiar. In aftermath of World War II, United States Occupation forces in Japan dedicated themselves to two initial tasks: country's democratization and its pacification. Working with representatives of Japanese government, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Pacific Douglas MacArthur and his team crafted a new constitution reflecting both goals. Although this constitution, officially adopted in 1947, maintained some of institutional features of prewar Japanese government -- especially its parliamentary system and a role for emperor -- it emphasized democratic rights and liberties and included a new legal commitment to pacifism. In Article IX of constitution, Japan forever renounces threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes and further stipulates that land, sea, and air forces. . . will never be maintained. In explicit language, section concludes, the right of belligerency of state will not be recognized. This, it seemed, would satisfy American desire to avoid a future war with Japan. Within a few short years, however, U.S. authorities -- who occupied Japan until 1952 -- added two more goals for nation, both tied to developing Cold War with Soviet Union. …