2006•Asia Pacific Journal of Public AdministrationRequires access

Probing System Limits: Decentralisation and Local Political Accountability in Vietnam

Scott A. Fritzen

Open publisher page 73 citations

Abstract

Decentralisation occupies an important space in debates over public-sector reform in doimoi Vietnam. This article assesses the changing distribution of roles, responsibilities and resources across levels of government over the past decade. Vietnam is incrementally transfering greater administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the provincial level. In addition, the Communist Party is attempting to prevent local corruption through a much touted “grassroots democratisation” initiative. Yet such moves towards decentralisation, however cautious, are problematic in terms of their bureacratic politics and potential impacts on poverty. Incentives for bureacratic actors and local leaders to transfer meaningful control downwards are weak or non-existent within the current governance structure, which centralises political power and emphasises hierarchical, sectoral controls over decision-making and resources. And decentralisation trends are exacerbating the weak administrative and fiscal capacities of poorer provinces, threatening to reinforce rather than reduce Vietnam’s widening regional and rural-urban disparities. A more proactice role for the centre in redistributing resources, providing technical support and establishing a facilitative policy framework will be crucial if decentralisation is to contribute towards improved socioeconomic outcomes in Vietnam’s poorest regions. In existing and necessary future arrangements, requirements and asociated mechanisms of accountability are of key significance.

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What this paper is about

Decentralisation occupies an important space in debates over public-sector reform in doimoi Vietnam. This article assesses the changing distribution of roles, responsibilities and resources across levels of government over the past decade. Vietnam is incrementally transfering greater administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the provincial level. In addition, the Communist Party is attempting to prevent local corruption through a much touted “grassroots democratisation” initiative. Yet such moves towards decentralisation, however cautious, are problematic in terms of their bureacratic politics and potential impacts on poverty. Incentives for bureacratic actors and local leaders to transfer meaningful control downwards are weak or non-existent within the current governance structure, which centralises political power and emphasises hierarchical, sectoral controls over decision-making and resources. And decentralisation trends are exacerbating the weak administrative and fiscal capacities of poorer provinces, threatening to reinforce rather than reduce Vietnam’s widening regional and rural-urban disparities. A more proactice role for the centre in redistributing resources, providing technical support and establishing a facilitative policy framework will be crucial if decentralisation is to contribute towards improved socioeconomic outcomes in Vietnam’s poorest regions. In existing and necessary future arrangements, requirements and asociated mechanisms of accountability are of key significance.

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Available abstract

Decentralisation occupies an important space in debates over public-sector reform in doimoi Vietnam. This article assesses the changing distribution of roles, responsibilities and resources across levels of government over the past decade. Vietnam is incrementally transfering greater administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the provincial level. In addition, the Communist Party is attempting to prevent local corruption through a much touted “grassroots democratisation” initiative. Yet such moves towards decentralisation, however cautious, are problematic in terms of their bureacratic politics and potential impacts on poverty. Incentives for bureacratic actors and local leaders to transfer meaningful control downwards are weak or non-existent within the current governance structure, which centralises political power and emphasises hierarchical, sectoral controls over decision-making and resources. And decentralisation trends are exacerbating the weak administrative and fiscal capacities of poorer provinces, threatening to reinforce rather than reduce Vietnam’s widening regional and rural-urban disparities. A more proactice role for the centre in redistributing resources, providing technical support and establishing a facilitative policy framework will be crucial if decentralisation is to contribute towards improved socioeconomic outcomes in Vietnam’s poorest regions. In existing and necessary future arrangements, requirements and asociated mechanisms of accountability are of key significance.

Key concepts: Decentralization, Grassroots, Accountability, Politics, Incentive, Democratization, Corporate governance, Political science

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