Collusion in Public Procurement: ways of analysis
Светлана Пивоварова
Abstract
Open-access reader
Светлана Пивоварова
Abstract
Open-access reader
The paper presents a brief overview of theoretical and empirical literature on collusion in public procurement. We discuss the main economic models of collusion, the impact of market factors on the appearance and sustainability of collusion, and the ways of hindering collusion in the public procurement through different stages of the procurement cycle. We also describe the main empirical and econometric models of detecting and classifying collusion in the public procurement.
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The paper presents a brief overview of theoretical and empirical literature on collusion in public procurement. We discuss the main economic models of collusion, the impact of market factors on the appearance and sustainability of collusion, and the ways of hindering collusion in the public procurement through different stages of the procurement cycle. We also describe the main empirical and econometric models of detecting and classifying collusion in the public procurement.
Key concepts: Collusion, Procurement, Industrial organization, Business, Microeconomics, Economics, Marketing