2010•Korean Journal of Defense AnalysisRequires access

From a buffer zone to a strategic burden: evolving Sino-North Korea relations during the Hu Jintao era

Heungkyu Kim

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to understand China's changing strategic views on North Korea during Hu Jintao's era and to consider the implications for South Korea's policies toward North Korea and China. Sino-North Korea cooperation can be theoretically explained by the alliance transition theory, a modified one from the political realist perspective. The implications of the alliance transition theory are that China would strengthen its alliance with North Korea, seek to weaken the South Korea–U.S. alliance, and induce South Korea to cooperate with China, while preventing North Korea from getting close to the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even in China, there exist various groups of strategic thinking in international relations on China's roles in North Korean issues. North Korea's incessant provocations have effects on mobilizing the Developing Country Diplomacy School as well as the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School against North Korea. Such incidences would soon reverse the rule of thumb of North Korea's strategic value rising alongside regional tensions, calling into question in China, again, the strategic value of North Korea. China still maintains its previous policy priorities at askance, but since North Korea's second nuclear test, the contents have been changing reflecting the changing security environments and its recalculation of national interests. As the more the North Korean nuclear crisis deepens, threatening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the more China would positively think over North Korea's contingency intensifying cooperation with the United States. In such transition, the stronger the rising great power thinkers, the less the diplomatic space for North Korea exists. North Korea would stop being a buffer zone but a strategic burden in their perspective, transforming China's relationship with North Korea from a special relationship to a normal state-to-state relationship.

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What this paper is about

The purpose of this article is to understand China's changing strategic views on North Korea during Hu Jintao's era and to consider the implications for South Korea's policies toward North Korea and China. Sino-North Korea cooperation can be theoretically explained by the alliance transition theory, a modified one from the political realist perspective. The implications of the alliance transition theory are that China would strengthen its alliance with North Korea, seek to weaken the South Korea–U.S. alliance, and induce South Korea to cooperate with China, while preventing North Korea from getting close to the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even in China, there exist various groups of strategic thinking in international relations on China's roles in North Korean issues. North Korea's incessant provocations have effects on mobilizing the Developing Country Diplomacy School as well as the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School against North Korea. Such incidences would soon reverse the rule of thumb of North Korea's strategic value rising alongside regional tensions, calling into question in China, again, the strategic value of North Korea. China still maintains its previous policy priorities at askance, but since North Korea's second nuclear test, the contents have been changing reflecting the changing security environments and its recalculation of national interests. As the more the North Korean nuclear crisis deepens, threatening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the more China would positively think over North Korea's contingency intensifying cooperation with the United States. In such transition, the stronger the rising great power thinkers, the less the diplomatic space for North Korea exists. North Korea would stop being a buffer zone but a strategic burden in their perspective, transforming China's relationship with North Korea from a special relationship to a normal state-to-state relationship.

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Available abstract

The purpose of this article is to understand China's changing strategic views on North Korea during Hu Jintao's era and to consider the implications for South Korea's policies toward North Korea and China. Sino-North Korea cooperation can be theoretically explained by the alliance transition theory, a modified one from the political realist perspective. The implications of the alliance transition theory are that China would strengthen its alliance with North Korea, seek to weaken the South Korea–U.S. alliance, and induce South Korea to cooperate with China, while preventing North Korea from getting close to the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even in China, there exist various groups of strategic thinking in international relations on China's roles in North Korean issues. North Korea's incessant provocations have effects on mobilizing the Developing Country Diplomacy School as well as the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School against North Korea. Such incidences would soon reverse the rule of thumb of North Korea's strategic value rising alongside regional tensions, calling into question in China, again, the strategic value of North Korea. China still maintains its previous policy priorities at askance, but since North Korea's second nuclear test, the contents have been changing reflecting the changing security environments and its recalculation of national interests. As the more the North Korean nuclear crisis deepens, threatening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the more China would positively think over North Korea's contingency intensifying cooperation with the United States. In such transition, the stronger the rising great power thinkers, the less the diplomatic space for North Korea exists. North Korea would stop being a buffer zone but a strategic burden in their perspective, transforming China's relationship with North Korea from a special relationship to a normal state-to-state relationship.

Key concepts: Alliance, China, Diplomacy, Peninsula, Political science, Great power, East Asia, Contingency

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